In “One dimensional man, Herbert Marcuse, a disciple of Heidegger, and a proponent of the Frankfurt school of critical theory, writes that… from purely Hegelian approach to life merely being a source of … we arrive at the meaninglessness of life beyond the observables.
Reliance on pure reason, according to Heidegger, alienates us from life, as experiences by us beyond rational reasoning, and as such leads to the downfall of civilization. He reasons that reality, to us, is not entirely understood by pure reasoning but also in a shared historical context and through non-discursive engagement with our world, i.e. through the experience of “what things/actions mean”. We learn to attune ourselves to the world while performing an act of engagement with reality in a way that defies reason. How do we cook? How do we bike? How do we cut wood? Which method do we choose to solve an integral? His criticism of metaphysics aims at explaining the modern issues faced by modernity, the loss or absence of genuine meaning, inaccessible through rationality. In his words, the real question to be answered is, what it means to be, to exist. How will this be incorporated in machines?
Marcuse considers critical consciousness as the most fundamental defence against the one dimensionality of human existence in the age of capitalism where individual freedom is suppressed by rationality of consumerism with survives through an imposition of conformism and superficial comfort, indeed itself as the only remaining alternative for societal organisation if not human existence. Alternatives to current systems are, in other words, suppressed by the one-dimensionality of our existence. Although heavily influenced by Marx, instead of focusing on means of production, exploitation of labor, alienation and the structures of domination and the creation of class struggle, Marcuse’s primary focus is the ability of the capitalist system to manipulate the masses through satisfaction of false needs, thereby preventing them from engaging not only in revolution but also, and perhaps more importantly, their ability to engage in revolutionary thought and pacified by the consumerism i.e. satisfaction of false needs as mentioned above.
In some sense, he differs from Marx’s rigid view of the class societies and the historic necessity of revolutions. In his view, capitalism (and perhaps ideologies in general) have the ability to adapt in order to maintain power. In his view new forms of control and manipulation materially as well as culturally, emerge in order to maintain the power of the dominant classes. The masses are manipulated through mass media and consumerism (creation of false narratives, satisfaction of superficial needs etc) thereby creating a “false consciousness” that prevents genuine revolutionary change while seeking emancipation and liberation. This is a broader critique of the capitalist system as it is extended beyond material exploitation to include various forms of control measures that reinforce the power dynamics of the existing system by preventing critical examination.
If emancipation and liberation is still possible in human societies by forming alternative collectives or societies that question the existing mechanisms, i.e. by forming critical consciousness, this is definitely not possible in a world run by machines, particularly in the service of dominant power structures.
In a world dominated by machines, particularly if they are shaped and controlled, algorithmically or otherwise, by the dominating powers, lack of authenticity, as described by Heidegger is beyond obvious and the emergence of a dystopian world absolutely where humans are the most dangerous entities is what we should expect. Even if we step away from Heidegger’s emphasis on authenticity as a means of acquiring meaningful knowledge about the world i.e. by doing instead of imitating, even if we can say that machines can acquire super-human knowledge of what consists a cancerous tumor, we must side with Adrono’s idea of the necessity of socio-political and historical facts in criticism of modernity i.e. industrialized society instead of Heidegger’s ontological approach.
Yet, ontology seems essential as we enter the age of machines and agi. As much as we grapple with what it means for us to be, to exist and to function in this world, we will need to extend our incomplete understanding of the self to the machines. What does it mean to us that machines exist? And what does it mean to the machines to exist? What does existence mean to a machine? We cannot know. But it is in this absence of knowledge that the real danger may exist. It is in this in-between world of not knowing the entirety of our existence that we may outsource our most fundamental functions to machines (artificial wombs).
The fear of machines is reminiscent of the ability of machines to follow some kind of Hegelian dialectic i.e. the ability to engage in a developmental process that takes the machines from being to becoming. Machines fail the first of the three pillars of this dynamical process (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) thanks to the fact that they do not have a concept of being. But how is this then relevant in the current context? One problem is that while machines may not have an initial concept or a notion of being, this concept can be artificially implanted in them. Machines do not grow up, they are not engaged in social interactions and they do not depend on it to form an identity or a sense of being as a result of their interaction with their environment. But if they are given an identity, they may very well engage in a quasi-Hegelian dynamical process.
It is somewhat absurd but also tantalising that the drive to create super human intelligence is at least in part based on the hope that machines will satisfy our need to understand what is or at least has been historically or even principally beyond our cognition. What does it mean to understand something? What does it mean to be conscious? Do we live in the best of worlds? Is capitalism, as it projects itself, the only viable form of existence? Will a super-human intelligence be friendly to us? Or will it view us, as we might suspect, as nusance to be disposed of? Will it love us?